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Abstract
This paper revisits the currency crises model of Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee
(2000, 2001, 2004), who show that if there exist nominal price rigidities and private
sector credit constraints, and the credit multiplier depends on real interest rates, then
the optimal monetary policy response to the threat of a currency crisis is restrictive.
We demonstrate that this result is primarily due to the uncovered interest parity
assumption. Assuming that the exchange rate is a martingale restores the case for
expansionary reaction — even with foreign–currency debt in firms’ balance sheets.
The effect of lower interest rates on output can help restore the value of the currency
due to increased money demand.
JEL: E51, F30, O11
Key Words: Currency crises, Foreign–currency debt, Balance sheets, Interest par-
ity, Monetary policy.
1 Introduction
The optimal response of monetary policy to prevent or resolve a currency crisis has at-
tracted a lot of attention in the literature, in particular in the aftermath of the Asian
∗∗Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestræde 6, DK–
1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark. Email address: Michael.Bergman@econ.ku.dk
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crisis 1997–98. According to the IMF, a tighter monetary policy combined with restric-
tive fiscal policies aiming at restoring credibility and confidence in the currency is the
appropriate policy response. The monetary policy response followed in most East–Asian
during the 1997–1998 crises was to increase interest rates sharply.1 Despite intense criti-
cism (see for example Furman and Stiglitz (1998)), this policy can be defended. Domestic
borrowers had issued large un–hedged foreign currency liabilities, the domestic currency
cost of which was rising rapidly as the value of their currencies fell. There was an urgent
need to stop the capital outflows and reverse the large depreciations which were leading
to default and economic crises.
It remains unclear, however, how effective this policy response was. Its logic depends
crucially on the effectiveness of the interest rate as a tool to induce immediate changes in
the exchange rate. There is a recent discussion concerning the effectiveness of tight mon-
etary policy where it is often argued that such policy is generally ineffective in reversing
large devaluations during crises.2 To some extent, the developments in the East–Asian
countries during and after the crisis of 1997–98 lend support to this view — in each af-
fected country, the interest rate defense was not successful in appreciating the currency,
and they all entered severe economic recessions.3
The experience during the Asian crisis, therefore, casts doubt on the effectiveness of
tight monetary policy in resolving currency crises, and particularly its ability to prevent a
severe downturn in output. Moreover, in a recent study of 22 episodes of systemic sudden
stops that took place during the Tequila crisis 1994, the East–Asian crisis in 1997 and the
1This was done by Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. The same stance
was adopted by Mexico in the 1994–1995 crises.
2There is no concensus in the empirical literature. Tight monetary policy may increase, decrease,
or may not affect the probability of a successful speculative attack. (See Furman and Stiglitz (1998),
Gould and Kamin (2001), Kraay (2003) and Goderis and Ioannidou (2008).) A number of studies have
attempted to explain precisely why interest rate defences may fail. Bensaid and Jeanne (1997) develop a
theoretic model where the anticipation that the authorities will try to protect the value of the currency
by raising interest rates can lead to self–fulfilling currency crisis (see also Radelet and Sachs (1998)).
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (2001) discuss evidence of “double play” strategies where investors take
short positions in the target currency and bond markets, so an interest rate defense permits the speculator
to gain from either (or both) the currency depreciation or a fall in bond prices brought about by the
interest rate rise. In such cases the possibility of an interest rate defense may stimulate further the
incentive for large traders to sell the currency.
3The nominal exchange rates fell by more than 20% in Singapore and Taiwan, and more than 40%
in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand during the crisis according to Deutsche Bank Research
(dbresearch.com). Output growth also fell sharply and in 1998 all affected countries had a negative
growth rate. It is also noteworthy that economic growth did not recover: the average growth rate after
the crisis is lower or much lower than the average growth rate before the crisis.
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Russian crisis in 1998, Ortiz, Ottonello and Sturzenegger (2007) find that countries that
followed the IMF recommendation of raising interest rates and implementing a restrictive
fiscal policy experienced larger falls in output than countries implementing a looser policy.
It is, of course, difficult to interpret such results, as the authors note, since we do not
know if the specific countries that followed tighter policy would have fared better if they
had loosened up the policy.
The view that tight monetary policy is the optimal response to emerging currency
crises is to a large degree supported by third–generation models focusing on balance–sheet
effects and currency mismatches.4 (See for example Krugman (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta
and Banerjee (2000,2001,2004), Cho and Kasa (2007), and Miller, García–Fronti and
Zhang (2005,2006).) Motivated by the facts presented by the Asian crisis of 1997–1998,
these models depart from the previous generations of theoretic models, for example by
placing the behavior of the private sector at center stage, and emphasizing the balance
sheet effects of foreign currency borrowing as a determinant of crises. These models
provide consistent frameworks with which to analyze the optimal monetary response to
prevent or resolve currency crises, and have rationalized the interest rate response referred
to above. According to the third–generation models mentioned above, a tight monetary
policy will dampen the fall in output by its effect on the exchange rate. An appreciated
currency will reduce borrowing costs, increase profits and therefore also increase output,
all other things being equal.
A common assumption in most monetary models of exchange rates including the third–
generation currency crises models is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition,
which states that the expected rate of depreciation should be equal to the interest rate
differential, holds.5 This assumption serves to ensure a link between current interest
rates and current exchange rates which also serves as a link between the monetary policy
response to an emerging currency crisis.
It is unfortunate that UIP is used since there is a large body of literature suggesting
4Allen et.al. (2002) surveys the early literature on balance–sheet effects. Blackburn and Sola (1993)
provide a survey of first–generation models whereas Rangvid (2001) surveys the second–generation mod-
els.
5See Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004), Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2006),
Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004), and Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2005). An interesting exception is
Christiano, Gust and Raldos (2004) who find that tight monetary policy is not the appropriate policy
recommendation in a model relaxing UIP.
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that the condition does not hold in the short–run.6 In particular, the empirical literature
suggests that in the short–run, exchange rates very often move in the opposite direction
to the UIP prediction: higher domestic interest rates (relative to foreign) are associated
with appreciation, not depreciation. Flood and Rose (2002) find that the slope coefficient
in regressions of the interest differential on exchange rate depreciation (which is equal to 1
if UIP holds) is negative for twelve out of 21 currencies, essentially zero in two cases, and
positive in seven cases (only three of these are statistically significantly different from zero
but different from unity) using monthly data. When monetary tightening is advocated to
prevent or resolve crises, it is normally expected that the exchange rate will stabilize or
appreciate in response within a short period of time. If not, the benefit of preventing the
deterioration of firms’ balance sheets due to depreciation will not be enjoyed — output
may have already fallen before the currency recovers. The empirical evidence suggests
that this link between interest rates and exchange rates through the UIP relation is not
very strong. Therefore, it is of import to investigate whether theoretical models which
justify or rationalize the sort of action recommended by the IMF (in response to the
1997–98 South East Asian crisis) rest on the UIP assumption.
The purpose of this paper is to modify the monetary framework developed in the
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000,2001,2004) (henceforth ABB) papers by relaxing
the UIP assumption. We replace the UIP relation with the assumption that the nominal
exchange rate is a martingale process. We demonstrate that the case for tight monetary
policy primarily is due to the assumption that UIP holds, not due to the dependence of
the credit multiplier on real interest rates. Relaxing UIP, holding everything else in the
original ABB model unchanged, restores the case for loose monetary policy.7 Moreover, it
is shown that an expansionary monetary response need not lead to further depreciations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we first present the
essential features of the real sector following the ABB (2001) model. We then introduce
and motivate the martingale assumption as an alternative to UIP; and discuss its implica-
tions for monetary equilibrium, which allow us to derive an associated LM curve. Section
3 contains our analysis of the appropriate monetary response to a negative supply shock
6This is a well–known result, see for example Chinn (2006), Froot and Thaler (1990) and Kilian and
Taylor (2003). However, empirical evidence suggests that UIP holds in the long–run, see for example
Chinn and Meredith (2004).
7Christiano, Gust and Raldos (2004) show, in a different setup which does not assume UIP, that
allowing further depreciation may be an effective response to crises.
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under different specifications for the credit multiplier. Section 4 concludes.
2 Aghion–Bacchetta–Banerjee setup without interest
parity
The parsimonious setup in ABB (2001) is appealing for the purpose of this study for a
number of reasons. Despite its simplicity the model is based on facts which are known
to have contributed to recent crises. First, it is consistent with the high level of foreign–
currency borrowing in the private sector of countries affected by the Asian crisis in 1997–
1998. Second, it reflects the substantial deviations from purchasing power parity com-
monly observed after the occurrence of currency shocks. Third, it captures the relationship
between decline in output during crises and financial sector under–development, in the
form of credit market imperfections. Fourth, although we concentrate here on the case
of flexible exchange rates, the framework is applicable under flexible and fixed exchange
rate regimes. Fifth, it predicts the occurrence of crises despite sound government fiscal
management and macroeconomic stability. And lastly, the clearly laid–out monetary side
is, by design, particularly well–suited for the analysis of monetary policy during crises.
Given our specific interest in this issue, the ABB (2001) setup lends itself easily to ana-
lytic clarity, without imposing the need for any more assumptions than what is necessary
to reflect the essential stylised facts.
2.1 The real sector
Consider a simple infinite–horizon small open economy monetary model with the common
features in ABB (2000,2001), except that uncovered interest parity does not hold.8 Fol-
lowing Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), prices are assumed preset for one period. Purchasing
power parity holds ex ante, so pt = Et−1(st) at any t, where pt is the domestic price for
period t and Et(st+1) denotes the expectation, at t, of the spot exchange rate (units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) at t+1. The foreign price level is constant
and equal to one. The central bank targets inflation in all periods except in period 1 when
there is a supply shock affecting the economy. This implies that the interest rate it for
t ≥ 2 is predetermined. The credit market is assumed to be imperfect such that firms
8For micro–foundations see Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2004).
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are credit constrained; they can borrow only a certain fraction of their wealth or cash
flow and the domestic credit market cannot supply enough funds implying that firms are
forced to borrow abroad.
The representation of credit market imperfections follows Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
in assuming that an entrepreneur’s borrowing capacity is a function of its internal funds
(the accumulation of retained earnings). In specific, letting wt represent current real
wealth, the total amount (identical) entrepreneurs are able to borrow, dt, is limited to a
multiple of wealth, i.e. dt ≤ µtwt.9
Output, yt, is assumed to be produced using working capital kt according to the
concave production function yt = σf (kt) where σ is technology.10 As in the original ABB
model, we assume that there is a supply shock in period 1 which will affect production.
In all subsequent periods, there are no shocks. This implies that there will be a unique
deterministic equilibrium in all other subsequent periods. Working capital is assumed to
fully depreciate every period implying that working capital at time t is equal to the sum
of cash flow from the earlier period and debt issued in the earlier period, or kt = wt + dt.
If the credit constraint binds, we then have that
yt = σf((1 + µt)wt). (1)
For period t, entrepreneurs can borrow in domestic currency at interest rate it−1 or in
foreign currency at the constant foreign rate of interest i∗. At the end of period t, nominal
operating profits net of financing costs are given by
Πt = ptyt − (1 + it−1) pt−1dct − (1 + i∗)
st
st−1
pt−1d
f
t (2)
where dct is debt issued in domestic currency and d
f
t = dt − dct is debt issued in foreign
currency. The first term on the right hand side of this equation represents operating prof-
its, the second term is the cost of domestic currency debt, and the third term represents
the cost of foreign–currency debt expressed in domestic currency units.
Let α denote the fraction of profits distributed as dividends. Assuming positive profits,
9We will concentrate on the case where the constraint is binding, i.e. dt = µtwt. The credit multiplier
will be specified in section 3.
10This assumption can be motivated using a technology–augmented Cobb–Douglas production function
— see ABB (2004).
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the remaining share of (1− α) is retained and used to finance future investment (directly,
and by determining the amount of external funds which can be borrowed), giving total
net wealth available for financing production in any period after start–up as
wt = (1− α)
Πt−1
pt−1
(3)
from which it follows:
yt = σf
(
(1 + µt)(1− α)
[
yt−1 − (1 + it−1)
pt−2
pt−1
dct−1 − (1 + i∗)
st−1
pt−1
dft−1
])
. (4)
This real–sector equation (the W–curve) shows how credit constrained entrepreneurs re-
spond to changes in the exchange rate. Observe that the third term on the right–hand side
of equation (4) represents the cost of foreign–currency debt in terms of domestic–currency
irrespective of whether UIP holds. This simple fact drives the negative relationship be-
tween output and the exchange rate in the previous period as it is illustrated in equation
(4). It captures the balance–sheet effect of currency depreciations.
The slope of the W–curve in the exchange rate–output plane is given by
∂s1
∂y2
=
p1
σf ′ (k2) (1− α)(1 + µ)
[
µ′
1+µ
− (1 + i∗) df1
] . (5)
If we, for the moment, assume that the credit multiplier is constant, we find that the slope
is always negative. This is the base case considered in ABB (2000,2001). A change in the
exchange rate in period 1 has a negative effect on output in the next period, through its
effect on foreign–currency debt, the balance sheet effect.
So far, the model is identical to the ABB (2000,2001) setting. In the next two sections
we first introduce the assumption we make regarding the behavior of the nominal exchange
rate and then we discuss the credit multiplier and the monetary sector when UIP is not
assumed to hold.
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2.2 The credit multiplier
Assume that the only restriction imposed on equilibrium exchange rate determination is
that the nominal exchange rate is a martingale, i.e., Et
(
st+j
)
= st for any t and j ≥ 1.11
This assumption replaces the UIP relation in the original ABB (2000,2001,2004) model.12
The martingale assumption is consistent with the classical empirical demonstration by
Meese and Rogoff (1983) showing that the out–of–sample forecasting accuracy of a simple
martingale (predicting the exchange rate to remain unchanged) is generally greater than
that of a variety of standard exchange–rate determination models.13 Theoretically, the
assumption can be justified by recent research (see Engel and West (2005)) showing that,
provided the discount factor is close to one, the exchange rate will follow a process arbi-
trarily close to a random walk if at least one of its fundamental determinants (which may
include unobservable fundamentals) has a unit root.14 Assuming that the exchange rate
process satisfies the martingale property does not therefore imply the absence of equi-
librating forces pushing the exchange–rate towards an equilibrium fundamental value.
Merely that at least one of these forces is I(1) — a very plausible assumption.
The next step is to specify the credit multiplier µt. As our base case, we assume that
the credit multiplier is a function of the real interest rate. Following ABB (2001) we
assume that domestic firms or entrepreneurs either can produce transparently and fully
repay their loans or hide the production value so that they default. It is also assumed
that there is a cost associated with hiding proportional to the amount invested (cptkt)
where c is the cost. Even if the firm defaults, the lender is assumed to be able to collect
repayments with probability q. The firm decides not to default if the net expected revenue
11More precisely: consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) where Ω denotes the sample space representing
the set of possible exchange rate paths, F is the σ–algebra generated by (s1, s2, . . . , st) representing the
flow of information generated by the exchange rate history and events up to time t, and P is the probability
measure on (Ω,F) — to be understood as an objective probability distribution, with respect to which
all expectations are taken. We are assuming that the exchange rate process is an Ft–martingale with
respect to P, and the expectations operator Et used throughout the paper is in fact EP (· | Ft).
12Note that the martingale assumption does not preclude uncovered interest parity. The latter can still
hold, but it is not assumed.
13For subsequent evidence documenting the persistence of this result see for example Froot and Thaler
(1990), Taylor (1995), and Kilian and Taylor (2003).
14The assumption is also consistent with the result in Manuelli and Peck (1990), who show precisely
that under certain conditions the martingale property is the only restriction that equilibrium exchange
rates have to satisfy.
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exceeds the net expected revenue under default, i.e.,
ptyt − (1 + it) pt−1dt ≥ ptyt − cptkt − q (1 + it−1) pt−1dt.
Simplifying this, we obtain
dt ≤ µwt
where
µ =
c
(1− q) (1 + rt−1)− c
.
The credit multiplier µt, thus, depends negatively on the real interest rate rt−1 and posi-
tively on the probability q reflecting monitoring or the degree of financial development.
The real interest rate is defined as
(1 + rt−1) = (1 + it)
pt
pt+1
implying that we can rewrite the credit multiplier as
µt =
c
(1− q) (1 + it) ptpt+1 − c
.
Since PPP holds ex ante we have that pt+1 = Et [st+1] and since the exchange rate is a
martingale we finally obtain
µt =
c
(1− q) (1 + it) ptst − c
. (6)
For t = 1 we then have
µ1 =
c
(1− q) (1 + i1) p1s1 − c
and
∂µ1
∂s1
= − c (q − 1) (1 + i1) p1
(cs1 + p1q (i1 + 1)− p1 (i1 − 1))2
> 0 (7)
and
∂µ1
∂i1
=
c (q − 1) p1s1
(cs1 + p1q (i1 + 1)− p1 (i1 − 1))2
< 0. (8)
We can now use these results to discuss the slope of the W–curve in the exchange rate–
output plane. The slope was given in equation (5). From this equation, and using our
– 9 –
results above, we find that the slope is ambiguous, it can be positive, zero or negative.
The reason is that an increase in the nominal exchange rate has two effects on output. It
raises the cost of foreign–currency debt (the balance sheet effect), with a negative impact
on output — as can be seen from the second square brackets in (4); but it also relaxes the
credit constraint — as is shown in equation (7); and impacts positively on y2, reflecting
increased availability of external funds for period–2. (This can be loosely interpreted as
a competitiveness effect in the sense that there is an increase in output following the
currency depreciation for a given level of foreign currency debt.) Hence, in the absence
of some form of policy response, the effect of a change in the nominal exchange rate
becomes ambiguous. There is a (negative) foreign–currency debt effect, and a (positive)
credit constraint effect.
We can distinguish between the following cases. The first case is when the foreign
currency debt effect dominates, µ
′
1+µ
< (1 + i∗) df1 . In this case the slope of the W–curve
is always negative. The limit is when dc1 = 0. This case also corresponds to the case
when the credit multiplier is constant. The second case is when the credit constraint is
not binding corresponding to very large values of the credit multiplier µ in which case
the W–curve is vertical. This is also the case if credit markets are absent, µ = 0, and
d1 = d
c
1 = 0. The third case is when there is no foreign debt, d
f
1 = 0, implying that the
slope of the W–curve is positive. As a fourth possibility, we have that the slope can be
positive when the exchange rate is low (an appreciated currency) and negative for higher
values of the exchange rate. All these cases are discussed by ABB (2000,2001). After
defining the monetary equilibrium and deriving the LM–curve, we will return to these
four cases below when discussing the possibility of a currency crisis.
2.3 The LM curve
The monetary setting is standard. Consumers have a real money demand function given
by mdt = md(yt, it), where it is assumed that md is increasing in yt and decreasing in
it, and md(0, it) > 0. Let mst denote nominal money supply at t. Then money market
equilibrium implies that
mst
pt
= md(yt, it). (9)
Under these conditions it is evident that there is an unambiguously negative contempo-
raneous relationship between money supply and the rate of interest. This obviates the
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need to distinguish between money supply and the rate of interest as the monetary policy
instrument.
Now, from ex ante purchasing power parity we have that pt+1 = Et(st+1). Thus the
LM curve (1) can be re–written as (mst+1/Et(st+1)) = md(yt+1, it+1). Using the martingale
assumption, we have that Et(st+1) = st and it then follows that
st =
mst+1
md(yt+1, it+1)
. (10)
This equation describes an LM curve consistent with a martingale process for the ex-
change rate, when purchasing power parity holds ex ante. In the current setup, equation
(10) replaces the IPLM equation in ABB (2000, 2001, 2004), with which it coincides only
if domestic and foreign interest rates are equal. It shows how (expected) monetary condi-
tions in period–2 affect the period–1 exchange rate, and indicates a negative relationship
between output and the previous period spot exchange rate. Intuitively, the expectation
of an increase in output over period 2 causes increased demand for money for that period,
leading to nominal currency appreciation. The anticipation of this future appreciation
increases the attractiveness of holding domestic currency in period 1, causing the latter
to appreciate.
2.4 Occurrence of currency crises
Starting in period 1, the timing of events is as follows: first the price level is set for
one period, and firms invest. An unanticipated shock then occurs. This shock takes the
form of an unanticipated shock to technology (unexpectedly lower σ), leading to lower
output and a depreciated currency. The monetary authorities respond using the money
supply or (equivalently) the interest rate. The monetary response determines the cost of
domestic currency debt maturing at the end of the second period, but has no effect on
period 1 profits. The change in period 1 exchange rate due to the unanticipated shock
does however affect profits realized in period 1. These, in turn, determine the amount
available for investment in period 2, and hence, period 2 output.
Equilibrium is defined as the intersection of the W–curve and the LM–equations above
(which can be illustrated graphically in the s1–y2 plane). As is also discussed at some
length by ABB (2000,2001), the model can produce both “good equilibrium” (normal
times with no currency crisis) and “bad equilibrium” (currency crisis). There are multiple
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equilibria if the W–curve intersects the s1–axis below the point where the LM–curve
intersects the same axis. The economy is understood to be in a currency crisis state when
the values of st and yt+1 that simultaneously satisfy both the W and LM equations consist
of the combination of a high (depreciated) exchange rate with output arbitrarily close to
zero.
In ABB (2000, 2001, 2004), interest parity (UIP) combined with the monetary equi-
librium leads to an IPLM–curve, relating the current exchange rate to current interest
rates and next–period output and interest rates. Short–run equilibrium is then defined,
for a given path of prices and interest rates, by the values of st and yt+1 that satisfy both
the IPLM and W equations — essentially a standard textbook intersection of the IPLM
and W curves, in (st, yt+1) space.15 In the absence of interest parity we do not have an
IPLM curve, only an LM–curve.
The slope of the W–curve determines whether there can be a currency crisis or not.
As discussed above, we have several possibilities. However, only two cases are of interest
when discussing currency crises: when the slope of the W–curve is negative; and when
it is positive for small values of the exchange rate, but negative for large values. In case
the slope of the W–curve is vertical, there can be no currency crisis since there is no
equilibrium with high nominal exchange rate and output arbitrarily close to zero. The
same holds for the case when the slope is positive, i.e., when foreign debt is zero.
Let us first consider the case when the slope of the W–curve is negative, the foreign
currency debt effect dominates.16 Suppose the economy is hit by an unexpected negative
supply shock. This will lead to a shift of the W–curve to the left such that for given
exchange rate, output will be lower. The new equilibrium, since the LM–curve is not
affected, implies therefore a depreciated currency and lower output. If the new W–curve
intersects the y–axis below the point where the LM–curve intersects the y–axis, there will
be a new equilibrium with output close to zero or zero. This holds regardless of whether
the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. The economic story is simple. Currency depreciation
raises the cost of servicing foreign–currency liabilities contracted in period–1. Since p1
is pre–determined, a depreciation causes an ex post deviation from purchasing power
parity and the increase in the domestic–currency cost of foreign–currency liabilities is not
hedged by an increase in revenues. This reduces period–1 profits which in turn reduces
15See ABB(2000, 2001) for graphical illustrations.
16This also corresponds to the case when the credit multiplier is constant.
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the capacity to borrow and invest in the second period. Hence we have a reduction in
period–2 output. We refer to this outcome as a currency crisis if it occurs at point where
the value of y2 is arbitrarily close to zero — in practical terms the combination of a
depreciated exchange rate with very low output.
The predictions of the model when the slope of the W–curve is first positive and then
turns negative for large values of the exchange rate s1 is very similar to the case when the
slope is only negative. If a negative supply shock affects production, the W–curve will
shift to the left leading to a fall in output and a depreciated currency as above and there
will be a currency crisis if the new W–curve intersects the y–axis below the point where
the LM–curve intersects the same axis.
3 The effects of monetary policy
In the present setting, changes in i1 need not lead to a reduction in s1. Hence, an increase
in the rate of interest cannot be relied upon to appreciate or restore the value of the
currency and prevent the reduction in period–2 output due to an increase in the cost of
foreign–currency debt (which in turn reduces profits and wealth and therefore borrowing
capacity).
In ABB (2000) the multiplier is assumed to depend only on the nominal interest rate
whereas in ABB (2001), it depends uniquely on the real interest rate, which stands in
one to one correspondence to the real exchange rate. ABB (2001) observe that either
extreme might be inappropriate as there are reasons to expect both real and nominal
interest rates to affect credit supply. They obtain sharply different policy implications
from merely varying this assumption: restrictive monetary policy is the optimal response
to the threat of a currency crisis when the credit multiplier depends on the real interest
rate, but not when the multiplier depends (only) on the nominal rate. This is seen below
not to be the case in the present setup, where the multiplier’s dependence on the real
interest rate is consistent with dependence also on the nominal rate. Since from the
analytic viewpoint this paper differs from ABB (2001) only in replacing interest parity
by a martingale for the exchange rate, it must be that the sensitivity of the model to the
distinction between nominal and real interest rates as credit supply determinants is due
to the interest parity assumption.17 This argument is now made more precise.
17In ABB (2001) the real interest rate is uniquely determined by the s/p ratio. Real and nominal
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3.1 Credit multiplier depends on both real and nominal interest
rates
Consider, first, the case where the effect on the cost of foreign currency debt dominates
(the slope of the W–curve is always negative), so that in the absence of some form of
policy intervention the economy will experience a contraction due to the currency shock.
Suppose that the monetary authorities react to the shock by tightening money supply
or (equivalently) raising the interest rate. From the expression for the credit multiplier
one sees that an increase in i1 leads to a reduction in µ, causing y2 to fall further. The
result is intuitive and straightforward: because the interest rate increase is ineffective
in appreciating or restoring the initial value of the currency, it does not prevent the
increase in the cost of foreign–currency debt. Yet, it tightens the credit constraint, with
the unambiguous consequence of exacerbating the reduction in output caused by the
currency shock.
In addition, the contraction in period-2 output (originally caused by the unantici-
pated shock but amplified by the tight monetary policy reaction) reduces period–2 money
demand. From the LM equation (10), and holding period–2 money supply (or the expec-
tation thereof) unchanged, the anticipation of lower period–2 money demand leads to an
increase in the exchange–rate in period–1. As suggested by Furman and Stiglitz (1998),
monetary tightening can increase the upward pressure on the exchange rate, pushing the
economy further to the currency crisis situation.
In contrast, consider an expansionary monetary response. Reducing interest rates
in period–1 lowers the period–2 cost of domestic–currency debt without increasing the
cost of foreign–currency denominated debt (since it does not provoke further currency
depreciation). Since µ is decreasing in the nominal interest rate, lower interest rates lead
to an expansion in external debt funding in period–2. This stimulates investment capacity
and (from the first square brackets in equation (4)) period–2 output — at least partly
compensating for the negative effect of the unexpected depreciation on profitability. In
the extreme scenario where the credit channel boost to output exceeds the contractionary
balance–sheet effect of the depreciation (net of the positive effect of depreciation on the
credit multiplier), period–2 output will increase. From LM equation (10), the stimulus
to output raises period–2 demand for money, the expectation of which exerts downward
interest rates are disconnected.
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pressure on the exchange rate in period–1.18 Thus, reducing interest rates can (at least
partly) restore the value of the currency and prevent a crisis.
Let us now consider the case when the slope of the W–curve is first positive for
low values of the nominal exchange rate and negative for large values, corresponding to
Figure 9(b) in ABB (2001). Suppose the economy once again is affected by an unexpected
negative supply shock. As above, the W–curve will shift to the left leading to a depreciated
currency and lower output since the the LM–curve is not affected. If the negative supply
shock is large enough such that the W–curve intersects with the y–axis at a point below
the point where the LM–curve intersects the same axis, there will be a currency crisis.
The effects of monetary policy are the same as in the case above when the slope of the
W–curve is always negative. A contractionary monetary policy will lead to further falls in
output since a higher interest rate tightens the credit constraint whereas an expansionary
policy leads to a loosening of the credit constraint which will reduce the effect of the
depreciated currency on output.
3.2 Credit multiplier depends only on nominal interest rates
Our assumption that the credit multiplier is a function of the real interest rate may be
critical for our results. Therefore we now assume that the credit multiplier depends only
on nominal interest rates: µt = µ(it−1), where µ′ < 0. In this case the equation for
period-2 output is simply given by
y2 = σf
(
[1 + µ(i1)] (1− α)
[
y1 − (1 + i0)
p0
p1
dc1 − (1 + i∗)
s1
p1
(d1 − dc1)
])
(11)
which differs from equation (4) only in the specification of the credit multiplier as µ =
µ(i1). An unexpected increase in the exchange rate s1 now has no effect on the supply
of credit. Its effect on output, through an increase in the nominal exchange rate s1, i.e.,
an increase in the cost of foreign currency debt, is unambiguously negative. Consider
an increase in interest rates i1 as the monetary response. From µ′ < 0 this leads to a
18By reducing the cost of borrowing in domestic currency without inducing further depreciation, loose
monetary policy could in practice also reduce the cost of refinancing foreign–currency liabilities with
domestic currency loans. This would prevent or at least reduce defaults on foreign–currency debt, and
therefore alleviate the contraction in credit following a large depreciation. Moreover, there is no incom-
patibility between third–generation models and previous models based on government mismanagement.
In cases where private sector foreign currency borrowing is coupled by large domestic currency public
debt, the contractionary consequences of raising interest rates would be magnified.
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reduction in external funding for period 2. Since the increase in interest rates does not
appreciate the currency, the reduction in µ amplifies the negative effect of the currency
shock on period–2 output. Moreover, the decline in period–2 output causes a decrease in
period–2 demand for money, the anticipation of which exerts further upward pressure on
the period–1 exchange rate. This follows from the LM equation (10), and presumes that
no increases are expected in period–2 money supply.
In contrast, responding by reducing i1 may prevent the decline in period–2 output.
The channels are the same. The lower interest rate expands the availability of credit in
period–2, which has a positive effect on output. If this effect is larger than the negative
effect of the currency depreciation, period–2 output may increase. Such an increase would
raise period–2 money demand, the anticipation of which puts upward pressure on the
value of the currency in period–1, at least partly reversing the effect of the unanticipated
depreciation. As in the case when the credit multiplier was a function of the real interest
rate, the appropriate or least harmful monetary policy response is expansionary, and
aimed at preventing a reduction in output.
3.3 Remarks
These results stand in contrast to the results from the original ABB (2000,2001,2004)
models unless the credit multiplier is a function only of the nominal interest rate. In our
setting where UIP is not assumed, the dependence of the credit multiplier on real and
nominal interest rates is not important. We reach the same conclusions regarding the
appropriate policy response in both cases. An interesting question is whether this result
applies to other extensions of the ABB(2000,2001) model.
Bouvatier (2004) extends the ABB (2000,2001) model by allowing for a risk premium
in the UIP relation. This reduces the efficiency of monetary policy but the main policy
recommendation is still to raise the interest rate to prevent or resolve a currency crisis.
Relaxing the UIP relation and introducing our martingale assumption in Bouvatiers set-
ting we again find that tighter monetary policy leads to a fall in output since the credit
multiplier is tightened and that expansionary monetary policy has the opposite effect.
Miller, García–Fronti and Zhang (2005,2006) extend the ABB (2000,2001) model by
introducing demand–side effects. In particular, they assume that output in period 1 is
demand determined instead of supply determined as in the ABB model. This implies that
there will be an additional negative effect on output in period 2. While there are still
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arguments that restrictive monetary policy should be used, their model suggest that the
fall in output could be reduced using an expansionary fiscal policy. It is straightforward
to replace the UIP relation with our preferred martingale assumption. In such a case,
the positive effects on output caused by the expansionary fiscal policy could be further
strengthened if it is combined with an expansionary monetary policy.
The main conclusion seems to be that the UIP assumption is critical. The result
that tight monetary policy is the appropriate way to prevent and resolve currency crises
depends solely on the UIP assumption. It is also noteworthy that Christiano, Gust and
Roldos (2004) reach the same result as we do in a model where UIP is not assumed to
hold. In their model, the degree of flexibility is critical. If there is not enough short–term
flexibility, then a restrictive monetary policy is optimal and the opposite holds when there
is a high degree of short–term flexibility.
4 Conclusion
This paper adds to the insights on the monetary policy response to prevent or resolve
currency crises caused by balance sheet effects, presented in the sequence of papers by
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000, 2001, 2004). Put together, these insights can
be summarized as follows. Consider an economy characterized by private sector credit
constraints and the existence of nominal price rigidities. Then restrictive monetary policy
is the optimal response to the threat of a currency crisis if uncovered interest parity holds
and the credit multiplier depends only on real interest rates — the case in ABB(2001). In
contrast, lower interest rates (or money supply expansion) is the appropriate response if:
a) interest parity holds and the credit multiplier depends only on nominal interest rates
— the ABB(2000) case; or b) the exchange rate is a martingale and the credit multiplier
can depend on real or nominal interest rates, or both — the case presented in this paper.
The intuition is straightforward: if interest parity fails, there is no reason to expect (in
the ABB setting) that an increase in policy interest rates will be successful in preventing
further depreciation in the short–run. Hence the exchange–rate stabilization benefit of
monetary tightening is lost, but the standard negative output effect is not. Monetary
tightening in response to a contractionary currency depreciation may prolong or accen-
tuate a crisis through two channels: first it reduces the availability of external financing
and increases the cost of domestic currency debt (without reducing the domestic currency
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cost of foreign currency debt), unambiguously weakening corporate balance sheets and
reducing output; second, the anticipation of the consequent economic recession can lead
to further short–term depreciations through the expected effect of lower output on money
demand. Conversely, reducing interest rates increases the availability of external funds
and lowers the cost of debt denominated in domestic currency without inducing further
depreciation. If its effect on output is sufficiently strong to raise output despite a currency
shock, lower interest rates can also exert upward pressure on the value of the currency,
through standard money market equilibrium effects, thus helping to defend the value of
the currency.
A caveat is in order. From a practical policy viewpoint, the idea of reducing interest
rates when a crisis seems imminent is admittedly vertiginous. The analysis ought to
be interpreted primarily as showing a specific set of conditions under which raising the
interest rate may worsen the effect of an initial shock. To the extent that the ABB
setup without uncovered interest parity as an assumption is a reasonable approximation
of reality, our analysis points to the importance of ensuring that raising the interest rate
will be an effective tool in stabilizing the currency in the very short term. If it is not
(and as discussed, this is not a settled issue), it may be better to, at a minimum, leave it
unchanged.
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